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Charles D. Weisselberg
Footnotes 
1. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. See State v. Rosch, No. 59703-5-I, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 2207
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2008) (unpublished decision); United
States v. Brunson, No.  07-4962, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19456 (4th
Cir. Sept. 11, 2008) (unpublished opinion); Reynolds v. Sherrod,
No. 08-cv-506-JPG, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60456 (S.D.Ill. Aug 08,
2008); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60070 (E.D. Wisc. July 23, 2008); United States v.
Singletary, No. 5:08-CR-12(HL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61012
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2008).  At least one court has rejected a claim
that such a prohibition is unconstitutional when the predicate
felony is not for a crime of violence.  See United States v. Westry,
No. 08-20237, 2008 WL 4225541 (E.D. Mich. Sept .9, 2008).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2007 Term had a sub-stantial and notable criminal docket.  There were very sig-nificant Second, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment decisions
as well as important rulings relating to basic habeas corpus
principles and federal statutes.  This article provides a selected
overview of the Term with a heavy emphasis on those cases
that may have the greatest impact upon the states.  The article
also suggests some questions left open by the Court’s opinions
and provides some preliminary indications of how several
decisions are being received in state and federal courts.  It con-
cludes with a preview of some cases to watch in the Court’s
current Term.
SECOND AMENDMENT
In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 possibly the most signifi-
cant criminal decision of the October 2007 Term, the Court
held that the Second Amendment confers an individual right
to keep and bear arms.  Respondent Heller, a law-enforcement
officer, sought to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforc-
ing its restrictive gun laws.  The District of Columbia essen-
tially prohibited possession of handguns.  It was a crime to
carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns
was generally prohibited.  There were additional restrictions
on keeping lawfully owned firearms loaded or without a trig-
ger lock; the law basically required lawfully owned firearms to
be immediately inoperable.  Heller lost in federal district court,
but the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms
and that the District’s laws violated that right.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 opinion authored by
Justice Scalia.  The majority opinion begins with an analysis of
the text and history of the Second Amendment.  The amend-
ment contains an operative clause and a prefatory clause.  The
Court found that the operative clause – “the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” –  “guarantee[s]
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation.”  The prefatory clause – “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State . . .” – fits with the
operative clause and does not restrict the right to possess and
carry weapons to members of an organized militia.  So cast, the
amendment protects “the inherent right of self-defense” and
extends to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute.”  The majority also found that its
construction of the Second Amendment was consistent with
interpretations of that provision from the period after ratifica-
tion through the end of the 19th century.  The justices charac-
terized the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,2 which found no
protected right to transport a sawed-off shotgun, as turning on
the lack of a relationship between that weapon and the types of
arms that a modern militia might use, rather than on the fact
that the defendants in the case were not themselves part of any
organized militia.  Finally, the Court’s opinion makes clear that
the Second Amendment does not prohibit restrictions on the
possession of firearms by felons and people who are mentally ill,
laws prohibiting carrying firearms in places such as schools and
government buildings, statutes placing conditions and qualifica-
tions on the commercial sale of firearms, and restrictions on
“dangerous and unusual weapons.”
The four dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s
view of the text and history of the Second Amendment and
would hold that legislatures can regulate the civilian use of
firearms as long as they do not interfere with the preservation
of a well-regulated militia.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer also
questioned how courts will determine whether a particular
firearm regulation is consistent with the amendment and
which constitutional standard courts will use.
Going forward, one might expect challenges to registration
laws that erect substantial barriers to possession of firearms as
well as challenges to laws that require weapons to be kept
unloaded or to have trigger locks or other devices that render
weapons immediately inoperable.  These, of course, were the
restrictions struck down in Heller.  We should also expect to see
some testing of the question of what other restrictions are rea-
sonable post-Heller and some difficult issues about whether
particular types of weapons are unusual or usual, and thus
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.  In
the first three months following Heller, courts have upheld laws
prohibiting possession of firearms by felons,3 by individuals
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4. See United States v. Booker, No. CR-08-19-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61464 (D. Me. Aug. 11, 2008); United States v. White,
Crim. No. 07-361-WS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60115 (S.D. Ala.
Aug. 6, 2008).
5. See United States v. Knight, Crim. No. 07-127-P-H, 2008 WL
4097410 (D. Me. Sept. 4, 2008).
6. See People v. Lynch, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 16, 2008) (outside home); United States v. Dorosan, Crim.
No. 08-042, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51547 (E.D. La. July 7, 2008)
(post office); United States v. Hall, Crim. No. 2:08-6, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29705 (S.D. W. Va., Apr. 10, 2008) (concealed
weapon outside of the home); United States v. Walters, Crim. No.
2008-31, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53455 (D.V.I. July 15, 2008)
(within 1,000 feet of a school).  For an interesting post-conviction
challenge to a lengthy federal sentence (based on Heller), see
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment to Vacate Portion of Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, in Angelos v. United States, No. 2:07-cv-936-TC (D. Utah),
filed Sept. 15, 2008.
7. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008)
(machine gun and sawed-off shotgun); Mullenix v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154-D,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51059 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) (reproduc-
tion of World War II-era machine gun); United States v. Lewis,
Crim. No. 2008-21, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51652 (D.V.I. July 2,
2008) (firearm with obliterated serial number).
8. The issue has been raised in a pending case, Nordyke v. King, No.
07-15763 (9th Cir.).
9. 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008).
10. See State v. Logan, No. 07-CA-56, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2489
(Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2008); United States v. Lopez, No. 07-
51037, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256 (5th Cir. July 7, 2008)
(unpublished decision).
11. See Rose v. City of Mulberry, Arkansas, 533 F.3d 678 (8th Cir.
2008); United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Wahl, No. 1:07cr18-SPM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43138 (N.D. Fla. May 30, 2008); see also United States v.
Strasnick, No. 08-PO-224 JLA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45353 (D.
Mass. June 10, 2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation in arrest
made by federal officer, where officer had probable cause but no
statutory authority to arrest); United States v. Wolf, No. CR. 07-
30102-01-KES, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62190 (D.S.D. Aug. 11,
2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation where tribal officers were
allegedly not properly commissioned).
12. See United States v. Franklin, No. 06-6499, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
14080 (6th Cir. July 1, 2008) (unpublished decision).
13. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
convicted of misdemeanor crimes involving domestic violence,4
and by people subject to restraining orders.5 Courts have like-
wise sustained restrictions on the possession of firearms in par-
ticular locations (or outside of the home)6 and laws relating to
sawed-off shotguns or unusual weapons.7 There is also the
question, which has been raised in the briefing in at least one
case, whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated
and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.8
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court issued only one Fourth Amendment opinion
during the 2007 Term; it addressed the relevance of state law
in determining the reasonableness of an arrest.  The current
Term has a much more substantial search-and-seizure docket,
as noted at the end of this article.
The Respondent in Virginia v. Moore9 was arrested for driving
on a suspended license, a misdemeanor under Virginia law.  A
search incident to the arrest turned up cocaine and cash, and
Moore was subsequently charged with a drug offense.  He
moved to suppress the evidence, pointing out that Virginia law
does not generally permit an officer to arrest a defendant for
driving on a suspended license.  The Virginia Supreme Court
ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment since the
officer should have cited Moore instead of arresting him.  The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the Court found that what is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state-law restric-
tions on searches and seizures.  If a state such as Virginia pro-
tects individual privacy more than the Fourth Amendment
requires, a defendant must look to state law for a potential rem-
edy rather than assert that suppression is required under the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Concurring, Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that Virginia law attaches only limited
consequences to a police officer’s failure to follow the
Commonwealth’s summons-
only instruction.
Moore has thus far been
cited to turn aside argu-
ments that officers who
allegedly arrested suspects
in violation of state law have
also violated the Fourth
Amendment.10 Several fed-
eral courts have relied on
Moore to overcome Fourth
Amendment objections
when state officers have
arrested individuals while
acting outside of the officers’
respective jurisdictions.11 A
federal court of appeals extended Moore to a case where a search
warrant was issued by a state court judge who allegedly lacked
authority to authorize a search outside of his county; a split
Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of evidence from the search
in a federal prosecution, albeit in an unpublished opinion.12
SIXTH AMENDMENT
This past year, the Court handed down several right-to-
counsel opinions with significant implications for trial courts.
The justices also tackled several important issues relating to
the Crawford v. Washington13 line of Confrontation Clause
cases.  One of the Term’s Crawford decisions interpreted the
“forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine.  The other Crawford case
concerned retroactivity rather than the contours of the
Confrontation Clause itself.
Right to Counsel
The most notable right-to-counsel decision of the Term was
Several federal
courts have relied
on Moore to 
overcome Fourth
Amendment 
objections when
state officers have
arrested individuals
while acting outside
of [their] 
jurisdictions.
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Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
Texas,14 which spoke to the
point at which the Sixth
Amendment attaches.  The
Petitioner was arrested on a
charge of being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm after a back-
ground check erroneously
showed a prior conviction for a
felony.  Officers took Rothgery
before a magistrate, who made a
probable-cause determination and set bail.  Rothgery posted
bail and was released.  He had no money for counsel and made
several oral and written requests for the appointment of a
lawyer, which went unheeded.  Rothgery was indicted almost
six months later and rearrested; he could not post a higher bail
amount and he was held in jail for three weeks.  Counsel was
eventually appointed.  The lawyer obtained Rothgery’s release
on bail and gathered paperwork showing that Rothgery in fact
had no prior felony conviction.  The charges were then dis-
missed.  Rothgery brought a federal civil rights action asserting
he would not have been rearrested and jailed for three weeks
had the county provided counsel within a reasonable period of
time following his initial arrest and appearance in court.  The
district court granted summary judgment to the county, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.  In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice
Souter, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority opinion notes that the Court previously
pegged commencement of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceed-
ings, whether by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.  The county argued
that the right to counsel did not attach at the initial appearance
before the magistrate, since (among other things) county pros-
ecutors were neither present nor had yet made an affirmative
decision to prosecute.  The Court rejected the county’s argu-
ment.  The opinion notes that the overwhelming consensus is
that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment.  The
federal practice (including in the District of Columbia) and the
practice in 43 states is to take the first step toward appoint-
ment of counsel before, at, or shortly after the initial appear-
ance.  About seven states may delay appointment until some
significant time after the initial appearance; though the prac-
tice in those states is not entirely clear, the Court stated that
there is no justification for the minority practice of not
appointing counsel on the heels of the first appearance.  Once
the right to counsel has attached, an accused is at least entitled
to the assistance of counsel during any “critical stage” of the
proceeding.  In a part of the opinion that commanded five
votes, Justice Souter concluded that “counsel must be
appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow
for adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as
well as at trial itself.”  A concurring opinion by Justice Alito
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia) argues that
counsel need not be appointed at any particular time, only so
far in advance of trial or any pretrial “critical stage” as to guar-
antee effective assistance at trial.  The matter was remanded to
determine whether the delay in appointing counsel prejudiced
Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Rothgery is an important case on the question of when the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.  Although the
Court left significant questions open—most notably, the justices
declined to state any standard for when a delay in appointment
violates the Sixth Amendment—the decision may lead a number
of jurisdictions to review their practices.  As one example, in
July 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided to bypass
Maryland’s intermediate appellate court and directly review the
question (raised in a class action lawsuit) whether indigent
defendants have a right to counsel at initial bail proceedings.15
Indiana v. Edwards,16 another significant Sixth Amendment
case, concerns the interplay of mental illness and the right to
self-representation.  Respondent Edwards was charged with
attempted murder and other offenses.  He was committed to a
mental-health facility after being found unfit to stand trial.  He
was eventually found fit and was tried almost six years after his
arrest.  Just before trial, Edwards moved to represent himself.
The judge denied the motion, and he was tried with counsel.
The jury convicted Edwards of several offenses but failed to
reach a verdict on the charges of attempted murder and battery.
Before his retrial, Edwards again asked to represent himself
because, among other things, he and his lawyer disagreed on
the defense to put forward.  The trial court found that Edwards
was competent to stand trial with counsel but was not compe-
tent to defend himself.  Represented by counsel, Edwards was
tried and convicted.  The Indiana appellate courts found that
Edwards was denied his right of self-representation under
Faretta v. California.17 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
Indiana Supreme Court’s judgment in a 7-2 decision authored
by Justice Breyer.
The majority opinion states that “the Constitution permits
judges to take a realistic account of the particular defendant’s
mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”
Further, “the Constitution permits States to insist upon repre-
sentation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial
under Dusky [v. United States18] but who still suffer from severe
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to con-
duct trial proceedings by themselves.”  The majority found room
for this holding by distinguishing the Court’s earlier decision in
Godinez v. Moran,19 which assessed competency to waive counsel
under the same standard as competency to stand trial.  However,
Godinez sought to waive his right to counsel and plead guilty
14. 128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008).
15. See Richmond v. District Court, 952 A.2d 224 (Md. 2008) (grant-
ing petition for writ of certiorari on the court’s own motion).
Maryland is not one of the “minority” jurisdictions referenced in
Rothgery, but the Supreme Court decision may have influenced
this action by Maryland’s highest court.  Richmond is set for 
argument in January 2009
16. 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008).
17. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
18. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
19. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
Rothgery is an
important case
on the question
of when the Sixth
Amendment right
to counsel
attaches.
20. There have been only a handful of reported cases applying
Edwards in the three months since the decision issued–not
enough cases to discern any trend.  However, one case to note is
United States v. Duncan, No. CR-07-23-N-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57151 (N.D. Idaho July 29, 2008) where the court applied
the enhanced standard for competency to a defendant who
pleaded guilty but who sought to represent himself at the penalty
phase of a federal capital case.  The court found that Duncan met
that standard and permitted him to waive his right to counsel.
21. 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
22. See State v. McLaughlin, No. SC88181, 2008 Mo. LEXIS 153 (Mo.
Aug. 26, 2008); State v. Milan, No. W2006-02606-CCA-MR3-CD,
2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 26,
2008).
whereas Edwards intended to waive counsel and proceed to trial
on his own.  The Court in Edwards said that a different standard
for competency to waive counsel should apply when a defendant
intends to go to trial but declined the State’s request to promul-
gate a specific standard.  Rather, the majority indicated that trial
judges “will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned men-
tal capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of
a particular defendant.”
The decision drew a forceful dissent by Justice Scalia and
joined by Justice Thomas.  The dissenters criticized the major-
ity for finding that “a State’s view of fairness (or of other values)
permits it to strip the defendant” of the right to present his or
her own defense.  Justice Scalia wrote that the decision to waive
counsel usually harms the defendant’s case, but the choice is
respected because it is one that belongs to the accused.  The dis-
senters also called the majority’s holding “extraordinarily
vague,” noting that the Court did not state a specific standard
or even accept Indiana’s position that self-representation could
be denied if an accused cannot communicate coherently with a
court or a jury.
The Court’s opinion raises a number of questions.  One is the
extent to which Edwards opens a crack in the Faretta doctrine.  In
previous cases, the Court was fairly adamant that judges could
not deny a request for self-representation because an accused was
unskilled in presenting a case or because the defense was likely
to become a train wreck.  This decision leaves room for a trial
court to deny a request to waive counsel based upon an assess-
ment of the defendant’s ability to make reasoned choices with
respect to which defense to present or some other aspect of the
defense case, so long as such the assessment is made as part of a
competency determination.  And it is unclear just how much dis-
cretion has now been left to trial judges, though that discretion
may be quite substantial in light of the lack of a specific compe-
tency standard and the majority’s suggestion of deference to trial
court determinations.20
Confrontation Clause/Retroactivity
The Court also significantly limited an exception to the
requirement of confrontation.  In Giles v. California,21 the defen-
dant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial in
which the jury was allowed to consider the decedent’s prior
statement to a police officer.  About three weeks before she was
killed, the victim reported that the defendant choked and threat-
ened her.  Her out-of-court statement was admitted because it
was deemed trustworthy, and she was of course unavailable to
testify.  Giles’s conviction was affirmed by the California appel-
late courts.  In a 6-3 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
decision.  As the justices previously held in Crawford v.
Washington, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
requires that a witness who has made a previous testimonial
statement be present at trial
for cross-examination.  If the
witness is unavailable, prior
testimony will be introduced
only if the accused had an
earlier opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.  The
Court had previously noted
two exceptions to this
requirement of a previous
opportunity to confront the
declarant: dying declarations
and “forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing,” meaning the introduc-
tion of a prior statement by a
witness who was detained or
kept away from the trial by
the defendant.  Giles pro-
vided the Court with the
opportunity to address the
contours of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, concludes
that the exception should only be applied “when the defendant
engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testi-
fying.”  The majority drew support from the language of the
exception at common law, the absence of common-law cases
that admitted prior statements on a forfeiture theory where
there was no conduct designed to prevent a witness from testi-
fying, and especially the common law’s exclusion of uncon-
fronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims in the many
cases in which the defendant was on trial for killing the victims
but was not shown to have done so to prevent the victims from
testifying.  The Court vacated and remanded so that the
California courts could consider the defendant’s intent on
remand.
Dissenting, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy) argued that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception
was (and thus still should be) much broader than held by the
majority.  He also asserted that because the defendant knew that
killing the decedent would keep her from testifying, that
knowledge would be sufficient to demonstrate the intent that
law ordinarily demands.  The three dissenters would establish a
fairly capacious test of intent, rather than require a specific
showing of motive or purpose.
Several courts have applied Giles in the few months since it
was decided.  The Missouri Supreme Court and Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals have affirmed convictions, finding
that the exception applied and noting its particular relevance in
cases involving domestic violence.22 Two courts have made
clear that the standard of proof to demonstrate forfeiture is a
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23. See United States v. Taylor, No. 1:04-CR-160, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68122 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2008) (finding no forfeiture
under a preponderance-of-evidence standard); Milan, supra note
22 (noting the standard, and affirming a finding of forfeiture).
24. 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008).
25. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
26. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
27. 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008).
28. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
29. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
30. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
preponderance of the evi-
dence.23
Danforth v. Minnesota24 is
another Crawford-related case,
but it addresses the power of
state courts to apply a new
decision retroactively on col-
lateral review; Danforth does
not concern the substantive
reach of the Confrontation
Clause.  It is significant to
underscore the greater avail-
able authority of the states (as
opposed to federal habeas
courts) to apply new rulings
retroactively.
The Petitioner in Danforth was convicted following a trial in
which the recorded statement of a six-year-old child was intro-
duced into evidence against him.  His conviction was made
final before the Supreme Court decided Crawford.  Although
the Supreme Court previously determined that Crawford estab-
lished a “new rule” that would not be retroactively applied in
federal habeas corpus proceedings25 under the principles of
Teague v. Lane,26 Danforth argued that the federal courts’ Teague
framework should not prevent state courts from developing
more generous rules of retroactivity.  In a 7-2 opinion authored
by Justice Stevens, the Court agreed.  Teague, the majority said,
addressed what constitutional violations might be remedied on
federal habeas corpus; it did not purport to define the scope of
any new constitutional right itself.  Teague’s general rule of non-
retroactivity was also “an exercise of this Court’s power to inter-
pret the federal habeas corpus statute.”  For these reasons and
others, the Teague rule limits the types of violations that will
entitle someone to federal habeas corpus relief but does not
affect a state court’s power to grant relief for violations of new
rules of constitutional law when the state is reviewing its own
convictions.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND JURY SELECTION
Snyder v. Louisiana27 is the most recent Supreme Court deci-
sion finding that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
under the principles set forth in Batson v.  Kentucky.28 Five
years ago, in Miller-El v. Cockrell,29 the Court held that the Fifth
Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability in a federal
habeas corpus case with a Batson claim.  When the case
returned to the Court several years later in Miller-El v. Dretke,30
the justices determined that the prosecution discriminated on
the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.  In so
ruling, the Court compared the prosecution’s treatment of white
and nonwhite jurors.  In Snyder, the majority again applied a
comparative analysis and gave greater insight into the trial
judge’s role when there is a Batson objection.
During jury selection in Snyder, 36 prospective jurors sur-
vived challenges for cause.  Five of the 36 were black.  All five
were eliminated by the prosecution through the use of peremp-
tory challenges.  When Snyder’s case reached the Supreme
Court, the justices focused on the prosecution’s explanation for
two of the challenges.  Batson sets forth a three-step process to
adjudicate a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on
race-purposeful discrimination:  First, a party must make a
prima facie showing that the challenge was based on race.
Second, if that showing has been made, the party that exercised
the peremptory challenge must offer a race-neutral reason for
challenging the juror.  Third, in light of the parties’ submis-
sions, the trial court must decide whether the objecting party
has shown purposeful discrimination.  Snyder, like Miller-El II,
addressed Batson’s third step.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court found
that the prosecution’s reasons for striking a juror were not
shown to be race-neutral.  The prosecution offered two reasons
for challenging a black juror.  According to the prosecutor, the
juror looked very nervous.  In addition, he was a student
teacher who might miss classes, and the prosecution expressed
concerns about whether the juror might come back with a
lesser verdict due to a need to get home quickly.  The trial judge
denied defense counsel’s Batson objection, saying only that “I’m
going to allow the challenge.”  The trial court did not make any
findings about whether the juror in fact appeared nervous or
whether the prosecutor was credible.  Further, the case was
tried in one week, and it seemed clear that this juror would be
able to attend at least a weeklong trial.  And applying a com-
parative analysis, it appeared that the prosecution did not
express similar concerns with respect to white jurors who had
time constraints that were at least as serious as those of the
black juror.  The judgment was reversed despite the dissenting
opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who criticized the
majority for second-guessing the fact-based decisions of the
Louisiana courts.
There are a few points to note.  The decision is an expression
of the Supreme Court’s continued concern with discrimination
in jury selection and an indication of the Court’s willingness to
review such cases.  The majority opinion also provides a second
recent example of comparative juror analysis in assessing the
credibility of a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations.  And the
decision underscores the importance of a trial judge’s on-the-
record findings about the credibility of the prosecution’s expla-
nations.  In the absence of anything in the record showing that
the trial judge believed the prosecution’s assertion that the chal-
lenged juror was nervous, the Supreme Court refused to pre-
sume that the judge found the offered race-neutral explanation
to be credible.
94 Court Review - Volume 44 
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31. 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).
32. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
33. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
34. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5449 (Oct. 1,
2008) (Order denying rehearing, and Statement of Justice
Kennedy respecting the denial of rehearing).
35. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5448 (Oct. 1,
2008)  (Statement of Justice Scalia respecting the denial of rehear-
ing).
36. 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008).
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Kennedy v. Louisiana31 was the third case in the last half-
dozen years to hold that a capital sentence could not be
imposed on certain offenders or for certain offenses.  In Atkins
v. Virginia32 and Roper v. Simmons,33 the justices ruled that the
execution of mentally retarded persons and juveniles violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  In Kennedy, a 5-4
decision, the majority ruled that a death sentence for someone
who raped, but did not kill, a child and who did not intend to
assist another in killing the child also violates these amend-
ments.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, follows
the general approach of Atkins and Roper to gauge whether
there is a national consensus against capital punishment for the
crime of child rape.  In assessing whether a death sentence for
the crime is excessive or cruel and unusual, the justices looked
for objective indicia of societal standards and then analyzed
whether the sentence was disproportionate.  The majority
determined that of the 37 jurisdictions (six states plus the fed-
eral government) that have the death penalty, only six jurisdic-
tions authorize that sanction for rape of a child.  “The evidence
of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for
child rapists . . . shows divided opinion but, on balance, an
opinion against it.”  Further, Louisiana is the only state since
1964 to have sentenced an individual to death for the crime of
child rape.  No individual has been executed for the rape of
either an adult or child since 1964, nor has anyone been exe-
cuted for any non-homicide offense since 1963.  The majority
also turned aside the claim that jurisdictions may not have
decided to authorize the death penalty for child rape because
states may have misinterpreted an earlier ruling (which prohib-
ited the death penalty for adult rape) as applying to child vic-
tims as well.  Then the justices applied their own judgment and
determined that in light of the legitimate purposes of punish-
ment, “the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for
rape of a child.”  In an opinion written by Justice Alito, four jus-
tices dissented, taking issue with virtually every aspect of the
majority opinion.
After the Court issued its ruling in June 2008, the State
sought rehearing.  As it turns out, the majority was not correct
to assert categorically that the federal government does not
authorize the death penalty for the crime of child rape.  The
military death penalty for rape has been in place for more than
a century.  The rehearing petition was denied, though Justices
Thomas and Alito would have granted the petition.  A state-
ment by the five majority justices argues that “authorization of
the death penalty in the military sphere does not indicate that
the penalty is constitutional in the civilian context.”34 Justices
Scalia and the Chief Justice concurred in the denial of rehear-
ing, though they asserted that the new evidence destroys the
majority’s claim that it was discerning a national consensus and
not just giving effect to the majority justices’ own preferences.35
Baze v. Rees36 was a much-
watched challenge to the admin-
istration of Kentucky’s lethal
injection protocol; indeed, the
case led to a de facto morato-
rium on executions in the
United States from the day after
certiorari was granted until the
decision issued.  
The federal government and
35 of the 36 death-penalty states
either require or permit execu-
tion by means of lethal injection.
At least 30 states, including
Kentucky, use the same combi-
nation of drugs in their lethal-
injection protocols.  The first drug, sodium thiopental, is a bar-
biturate sedative that induces unconsciousness.  The second
drug, pancuronium bromide, is a paralytic agent.  The third
drug is potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest.
Although it was conceded that if the three-drug combination
was properly administered there would be a humane death, the
Petitioners argued that there was a significant risk that
Kentucky’s procedures would not be properly followed.  In par-
ticular, the Petitioners alleged that the first drug (the barbitu-
rate) is critical and must be provided in sufficient quantity to
prevent severe pain and conscious suffocation when the other
chemicals are administered.  As part of their argument, the
Petitioners noted that veterinarians are prohibited from using
the second drug (the paralytic agent) in euthanizing animals in
the overwhelming majority of states.  By a 7-2 vote, but one
which failed to produce a majority opinion, the Court found
that Kentucky’s administration of its lethal-injection protocol
does not contravene the Eighth Amendment.  It is difficult to
derive a clear rule from the separate opinions in this case.
Perhaps the easiest way to understand the outcome is to com-
pare the three main substantive opinions, and then review the
separate opinions of Justices Alito, Stevens, and Breyer.
The judgment of the Court was announced by Chief Justice
Roberts in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito.
The Chief Justice’s opinion focuses upon whether particular
procedures pose a substantial risk of serious harm, which must
be an objectively intolerable risk of harm.  The Chief Justice
rejected the claim that simply because an execution method
might result in pain, either by accident or because of an
inescapable consequence of death, there is the sort of objec-
tively intolerable risk of harm that amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Nor could the petitioners prevail simply by showing that there
is an alternative procedure, such as a single-drug protocol (bar-
biturates only) that may be preferred.  As the Chief Justice put
it, an alternative protocol “must effectively address ‘a substan-
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tial risk of serious harm.’”  The
alternative procedure “must be
feasible, readily implemented,
and in fact significantly reduce
a substantial risk of severe
pain.  If a State refuses to adopt
such alternative in the face of
these documented advantages,
without a legitimate penologi-
cal justification . . . , then a
State’s refusal to change its
method can be viewed as ‘cruel
and unusual’ under the Eighth
Amendment.”  Applying this
test, the Chief Justice found on
this record that the Petitioners
had not shown that the risk of
an inadequate dose of the first
drug, as it is administered in Kentucky, is substantial.  
Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred but rejected the Chief
Justice’s formulation.  As set forth in Justice Thomas’s concur-
rence, the two rejected “as both unprecedented and unwork-
able” any standard that might require courts to weigh the rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages of different methods of exe-
cution or lethal-injection protocols.  In their view, “a method of
execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliber-
ately designed to inflict pain.”  Thus, any comparative analysis
“should be limited to whether the challenged method inher-
ently inflicts significantly more pain than traditional modes of
execution such as hanging and the firing squad.”  Justice
Thomas also argued that “today’s decision is sure to engender
more litigation.”
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissented.  They
agreed with the Petitioners and the plurality “that the degree of
risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives must be
considered.”  However, they disagreed with the Chief Justice’s
opinion with respect to the extent to which the “substantial
risk” test “sets a fixed threshold for the first factor.”  Applying
this more flexible test, the dissenters would remand to consider
whether the failure to include additional safeguards to confirm
that the inmate is unconscious after injection of the barbiturate,
in combination with other elements of Kentucky’s protocol, cre-
ates an unacceptable and readily avoidable risk of inflicting
severe and unnecessary pain.  
Justice Breyer concurred.  He agreed with Justice Ginsburg
as to how a court should review this type of Eighth Amendment
claim.  However, he could not find in the record or in the liter-
ature sufficient evidence to establish that Kentucky’s execution
protocol poses the type of significant and unnecessary risk of
inflicting severe pain that the Petitioners asserted.  Justice
Stevens concurred, finding no Eighth Amendment violation on
this record under the test set forth in either the Chief Justice’s
opinion or Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  He used this as an occa-
sion, however, to announce his general view that the death
penalty in the United States is now patently excessive and cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.  But being bound by precedent, he joined the
Court’s judgment.  Justice Scalia wrote separately to respond to
Justice Stevens.  Justice Alito wrote his own concurrence to
respond to the suggestion by Justice Thomas that the case
would result in greater litigation.
From the various opinions, there were three votes for the test
set forth in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, three votes for the
dissent’s more flexible test, and two votes for a test that essen-
tially compares modern protocols to the methods of executions
conducted throughout history.  Ordinarily, when five justices do
not agree on the rationale for a decision, the views of the mem-
bers who decide the case on the narrowest grounds represent
the holding of the Court.  There is an argument that Baze con-
tains no controlling opinion since it is difficult to characterize
any of the concurring opinions as providing a fifth vote on a
narrower ground than contained in the Chief Justice’s opinion.
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s failure to promulgate a single
standard, seven justices found that the administration of
Kentucky’s execution protocol did not violate the Eighth
Amendment on the record in this case.
In the immediate wake of the decision in Baze, the de facto
moratorium has lifted in a number of jurisdictions with execu-
tions taking place by lethal injection in at least Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
But because Baze reviewed only the specific record of
Kentucky’s procedures, litigation has continued as judges apply
Baze to evidence of the administration of lethal-injection pro-
tocols in other states.37 Most courts seem to treat Chief Justice
Roberts’s plurality opinion as controlling.38 Courts have tended
to dispose of lethal-injection challenges by comparing their
jurisdiction’s protocol with the evidence discussed in Baze
about the administration of Kentucky’s protocol.39
FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES AND SENTENCING
The last Term produced important rulings interpreting fed-
eral criminal statutes and affecting federal sentencing.  The arti-
cle summarizes a few of the statutory decisions, particularly
those that relate to the interplay of federal and state offenses
(Logan and Burgess) or apply to common add-ons for use of
weapons or explosives (Watson and Ressam).  The Court’s sen-
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tencing decisions are significant for both state and federal pros-
ecutions, as the Court has continued to enunciate principles
that apply in construing structured sentencing schemes. 
Federal Statutes
The Petitioner in Logan v. United States40 was convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Under the Federal
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), he was given an
enhanced sentence on the basis of three misdemeanor battery
convictions from Wisconsin.  The ACCA contains an exemp-
tion provision, providing that a prior conviction may be disre-
garded if it “has been expunged, or set aside,” or if the defen-
dant “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.”
Logan argued that because he never lost his civil rights as a
result of the three misdemeanor convictions, they fell within
the exemption provision and his federal sentence was improp-
erly enhanced.
The Court unanimously rejected the argument in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg.  Relying upon the plain language,
history, and context of the statute, the Court found that never
having rights taken away was not the same as having them affir-
matively restored.  While the ACCA defers to a state’s decision
to relieve an offender from the disabling effects of a conviction,
Congress did not mean to exempt instances where the offender
did not lose civil rights in the first place.  Thus, if a state intends
to allow an individual to avoid the ACCA consequences of cer-
tain convictions, it must act affirmatively to do so.
In Burgess v. United States,41 the Court resolved a conflict in
the way that prior state convictions might be used to enhance a
federal drug sentence.  Some federal drug offenses carry manda-
tory minimum penalties.  A 10-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is doubled to 20 years if
a defendant has previously been convicted of a “felony drug
offense.”  The Petitioner in Burgess had a prior conviction in
South Carolina for possessing cocaine.  The State classified the
offense as a misdemeanor although it carried a maximum sen-
tence of two years’ imprisonment.  Burgess claimed that the
State’s characterization must control, relying upon 21 U.S.C. §
802(13), which says that a “felony” is any “offense classified by
applicable Federal or State law as a felony.”  The government
countered that the controlling definition was the term “felony
drug offense,” described in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) as an offense
involving drugs that is “punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year under the law of the United States or of a State or
foreign country.”  The district court and court of appeals agreed
with the government.  The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court unanimously ruled that the definition set forth in
§ 802(44) alone controls.  In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg,
the justices point to a number of statutory features, including
that “felony drug offense” is a term of art within the statute and
the specific definition should control.  The Court also deter-
mined that the rule of lenity would not apply since there was
no ambiguity to resolve.  The specific statutory definition set
forth in § 802(44) is coherent, complete, and exclusive.
Watson v. United States42
addressed the question of
whether a person who trades
drugs to obtain a gun “uses” a
firearm “during and in relation
to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime”
as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c) (1) (A).  The Petitioner in
Watson told a government infor-
mant that he wanted to acquire a
gun.  The informant suggested
he could pay in narcotics.
Watson met with the informant
and an undercover law enforce-
ment agent.  He provided the
drugs in exchange for a semiautomatic pistol.  Watson was
indicted for a drug offense and for “using” the pistol during and
in relation to that crime.  He entered a conditional plea, reserv-
ing the right to challenge the factual basis for his conviction.
The court of appeals affirmed.  The Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed.
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court determined that
someone who provides drugs to obtain a weapon does not “use”
the weapon.  Though the justices previously decided in Smith v.
United States43 that trading a weapon to receive drugs is the
“use” of that weapon, the converse is not true.  Under the
Court’s precedents, “use” requires active employment of a
firearm.  Focusing on the plain language of the statute and its
context, the justices found that a person who gives drugs to
receive a weapon does not actively employ or use the gun.
Justice Ginsburg concurred to urge the Court to overrule Smith.
She also wryly noted that “at least when the subject is guns,”
“[i]t is better to receive than to give.”
Ressam v. United States44 involved an interesting (though less
common) offense and a direct link to the “war on terror.”
Ahmed Ressam came to the United States with explosives, plan-
ning to detonate them at the Los Angeles International Airport.
He was arrested entering the country and made false statements
on a customs declaration.  He was convicted in federal court of
a number of criminal offenses, including carrying explosives
“during the commission of any [federal] felony” in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).  The government’s theory was that
Ressam had carried explosives during the commission of the
felony of making false statements on a customs declaration.
The court of appeals reversed his conviction on the § 844(h)(2)
count, finding that the carrying of the explosives had to be in
relation to the commission of the other felony, and that no such
relationship was shown here.  Attorney General Michael
Mukasey personally argued on behalf of the government in the
Supreme Court, which reversed by a vote of 8-1.
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, provides
that the plain language of the statute requires reversal.  The term
“during” denotes a temporal link to the other felony, but the
statute contains no other qualification.  The statute merely
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requires that an explosive be
carried contemporaneously
with the commission of
another felony not that it be in
relation to or somehow further
the commission of that felony.
Although the Court was con-
cerned during oral argument
that a broad construction of
the statute could lead to
absurd results or give extraor-
dinary leverage to prosecutors,
the majority opinion does not
address those concerns.  They
are reflected in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Breyer, who
argues that because the term
“explosives” includes such
commonplace materials as gasoline or fertilizer, and the category
of federal felony offenses is so broad, the Court’s construction
may lead to strange results.  From the context of the statute, he
would find a requirement that the explosives be carried in rela-
tion to the other felony.
Federal Sentencing
The Court has been extraordinarily active over the last
decade in reviewing the constitutionality of federal and state
sentencing schemes.  Some of the most important decisions in
recent years include Blakely v. Washington45 and Cunningham v.
California,46 where the justices found that sentences imposed
under Washington’s guidelines and California’s determinate-
sentencing law violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury, and United States v. Booker,47 where the Court essentially
saved the United States Sentencing Guidelines by rendering
them “effectively advisory.”  Two cases decided on the same day
last Term dealt with some of the impact of making the Federal
Guidelines advisory.  If judges are no longer strictly bound by
the Guidelines, what force do they carry?  Must judges respect
all policy determinations that are reflected in Guidelines
ranges?  And how do courts of appeals review sentencing deci-
sions that substantially depart from applicable Guidelines
ranges?
In Kimbrough v. United States,48 the Petitioner was convicted
of serious federal drug and weapons offenses.  The drug crimes
involved crack as well as powder cocaine; for over 20 years,
federal crack-cocaine offenses have carried higher Guidelines
and statutory sentences than offenses related to powder
cocaine.  The statutory minimum for Kimbrough’s offenses was
15 years, though his guideline range was 228-270 months (19
to 22 1/2 years).  The guideline range for an equivalent amount
of powder cocaine would have been 97-106 months.  Taking
into account the much criticized distinction between crack-
and powder-cocaine sentences, the district court sentenced
Kimbrough to the statutory minimum of 15 years.  The court
of appeals vacated the sentence, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court
noted that sentencing judges may vary from Guidelines ranges
based upon policy considerations, including disagreement with
a policy of imposing much higher sentences in crack-cocaine
cases.  The majority specifically rejected the government’s argu-
ment that federal courts are required by Congress to respect the
100:1 ratio of amounts of powder to crack cocaine that lead to
equivalent Guidelines ranges.  While courts must still give
“respectful consideration” to the Guidelines, they are freed
from this ratio and the mandatory strictures of the Guidelines.
District courts should follow the instruction in Booker that sen-
tences must be imposed that are sufficient but not greater than
necessary to accomplish the various goals of sentencing
described in federal statutes.  Justices Thomas and Alito dis-
sented.  Justice Thomas continues to disagree with the remedial
holding in Booker.  Justice Alito would require sentencing
judges to give significant weight to the policy decisions in the
Guidelines (including, as here, various ratios), and would thus
remand for reconsideration.
Gall v. United States49 addressed a somewhat different prob-
lem:  how to review the reasonableness of a federal sentence
that is substantially below the applicable Guidelines range.  The
Petitioner in Gall joined a drug conspiracy but withdrew on his
own and stopped selling drugs of any kind.  Gall was arrested
for conspiracy several years later, after he graduated from col-
lege and found a job.  He pleaded guilty.  The applicable
Guidelines range was 30-37 months, but the judge sentenced
him to three years’ probation, which the district court reasoned
was sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the statu-
tory purposes of sentencing.  The court of appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
In a 7-2 decision and an opinion by Justice Stevens, the
majority found that the sentence was reasonable.  While a pre-
vious ruling of the Supreme Court had determined that in the
ordinary case a reviewing court may presume that a sentence
within the Guidelines is reasonable, all sentences are reviewed
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  Though the
extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the
recommended Guidelines range is relevant, the Court rejected
a rule that would require extraordinary circumstances or some
specific showing to justify a sentence that is outside of the
Guidelines or even outside of the Guidelines range by a partic-
ular degree.50 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
because its analysis appeared to resemble de novo review.  The
circuit failed to give due deference to the sentencing court’s rea-
soned decision that the statutory factors, on the whole, justified
the sentence.  As in Kimbrough, Justices Thomas and Alito dis-
sented.
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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Boumediene v. Bush51 was one of the blockbusters of the
Term.  Although the ruling directly concerns detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, whose cases are pending before a limited
number of courts, the decision should be of interest to a wide
audience.  Boumediene is now the leading case on the
Suspension Clause,52 the scope of common-law habeas corpus,
and what procedures might provide an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus.
In previous rulings, the Court determined that the privilege
of habeas corpus extends to detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
Further, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) did not
remove then pending habeas corpus cases from the federal
courts.  In response, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).  In Boumediene, a 5-4 major-
ity found, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, that the MCA was
intended to strip pending cases from the federal courts.
However, because the Act did not purport to be a formal sus-
pension of the writ, the detainees could still challenge the
legality of their confinement.  The question then became
whether the MCA could avoid a Suspension Clause challenge
because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures
for habeas corpus.  
To answer this question, the majority set out some basic
principles of common-law habeas corpus.  The privilege of
habeas corpus “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportu-
nity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erro-
neous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”  A habeas
corpus court must have the power to order the conditional
release of someone who is unlawfully detained, although
release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appro-
priate remedy in every case in which the writ is granted.  The
majority opinion also notes that “where relief is sought from a
sentence that resulted from the judgment of a court of record,
as is the case in most federal habeas cases, there is considerable
deference owed to the court that ordered confinement.”  Of
course, the criminal conviction “in the usual course occurs
after judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the out-
come and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own
independence.”  But where a person is detained by executive
order rather than after trial and conviction in a court, “the need
for collateral review is most pressing.”  The Court then
reviewed the few previous cases finding that statutory proce-
dures were adequate substitutes for the writ, such as the deci-
sion upholding 28 U.S.C. § 2255–the motion procedure that
allows federal prisoners to challenge their convictions and sen-
tences, and a case upholding restrictions on successive petitions
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which
were found not to amount to a substantial departure from com-
mon-law habeas corpus.  
The majority ruled that under these principles, and by con-
trast with these prior cases, the procedures afforded to
detainees at Guantánamo Bay are not an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus.  To begin with, the administrative forum for
contesting detention–the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT)–constrains a detainee’s
ability to rebut the factual basis
for the claim that the person is
an enemy combatant.  There is a
limited means to find or present
evidence, and the detainee does
not have the assistance of coun-
sel.  There is a risk inherent in
any process that is closed and
accusatorial, said the Court, and
the risk is too significant to
ignore given that the consequences of error may be detention
for the duration of hostilities that could last a generation or
more.  In addition, the DTA affords only limited judicial review
of the administrative determination.  Because a reviewing court
is essentially limited to the question of whether the CSRT fol-
lowed appropriate and lawful standards and procedures, it can-
not consider newly discovered evidence that could not have
been part of the administrative record, and that evidence might
be critical to a detainee’s argument that he is not an enemy com-
batant.  
In light of the CSRT process, the majority concluded that the
detainees’ access to the courts under the statutory review pro-
visions of the DTA is not an adequate substitute for the writ of
habeas corpus.  Thus, the MCA–which would strip federal
courts of the power to consider habeas petitions by these
detainees–effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.  
Four justices dissented.  The dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts takes on, among other points, the majority’s
finding that the CSRT and DTA procedures are not adequate
substitutes for the writ of habeas corpus.
Though Boumediene directly applies to a limited number of
individuals, it should stand as a cornerstone case on the mean-
ing of the Suspension Clause, the scope of common-law habeas
corpus, and on which procedures may be an adequate substi-
tute for habeas corpus.
In Allen v. Siebert,53 a much less momentous case (but one
still worthy of comment), the Court granted the State’s petition
for a writ of certiorari and summarily reversed the court of
appeals.  The case is notable for its explanation of how a state’s
dismissal of a post-conviction petition may impact the timeli-
ness of a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition.
Siebert filed his state post-conviction petition after the expi-
ration of a state statute of limitations, and it was dismissed as
untimely.  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 contains a one-year statute of limitations that is tolled
while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending.”54 Siebert filed a federal habeas corpus
petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely.  The
federal court of appeals disagreed, finding that Siebert’s state
petition was “properly filed” because the time bar was not juris-
dictional and the state courts had discretion whether to enforce
it.  In so ruling, the circuit distinguished a prior case from the
Court in which a petition was not found to be “properly filed”
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where the state’s time bar was jurisdictional.55 Reversing, the
Supreme Court said, in a per curiam opinion, that whether a
time limit “is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense, or some-
thing in between,” it is a condition to filing.  Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented and would have adopted the distinction
found by the court of appeals.
A LOOK AHEAD
An early look at the Supreme Court’s October 2008 Term
shows that the Fourth and Sixth Amendments are back on the
menu, along with issues relating to qualified immunity for offi-
cers and prosecutors, and a matter of particular importance to
capital defendants.  Though these cases are significant, there do
not yet seem to be the same sort of blockbusters that marked
the October 2007 Term’s criminal docket.
As of the opening of the October 2008 Term, the Court has
granted review in four search-and-seizure cases:  Herring v.
United States,56 which asks if evidence must be suppressed
under the Fourth Amendment where officers conduct an arrest
and search incident to an arrest in reliance upon credible but
erroneous information provided by another officer; Arizona v.
Gant,57 which concerns whether officers must demonstrate a
threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence to justify a
warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest after the vehicle’s
recent occupants have been arrested and secured; Arizona v.
Johnson,58 which addresses whether an officer who stops a car
for a minor traffic infraction may pat-down a passenger if the
officer has an articulable basis to believe that the passenger is
armed and dangerous but the officer has no reason to believe
that the passenger is committing a criminal offense; and
Pearson v. Callahan,59 which asks, among other things, whether
a “consent once removed” exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement authorizes police to enter a home without
a warrant after an informant buys drugs inside.  
Pearson may also provide a vehicle for a significant qualified
immunity ruling.  The justices directed the parties to brief and
argue whether the qualified immunity decision in Saucier v.
Katz60 should be overruled.  A second case involving qualified
immunity is Van De Kamp v. Goldstein,61 which asks whether the
doctrine shields the decisions of supervisors who direct policy
and oversee training with respect to prosecutors’ constitutional
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The Court has agreed to hear two Sixth Amendment right-
to-counsel cases.  Kansas v. Ventris62 asks whether the prosecu-
tion may impeach a defendant with statements obtained with-
out a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.  In Montejo v. Louisiana,63 the justices will
decide if, after the Sixth Amendment has attached, a defendant
who asks for counsel and is appointed a lawyer must take an
affirmative step to “accept” the appointment to receive the pro-
tections of the amendment and preclude police-initiated inter-
rogation without counsel. 
Other provisions of the Sixth Amendment are also before
the Court.  Vermont v. Brillon64 asks whether trial delays relating
to the appointment and representation of counsel may be attrib-
utable to the state and deny a defendant a speedy trial.  A
Crawford case is on the docket.  Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts65 concerns whether a state forensic analyst’s lab-
oratory report, prepared for use in a criminal case, is “testimo-
nial” evidence that is subject to the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.  In Rivera v. Illinois,66 the Court will take
up the question whether the erroneous denial of a defendant’s
peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal of a convic-
tion.  And the justices have granted review in another
Apprendi/Blakely case.  In Oregon v. Ice,67 they will decide
whether the Sixth Amendment requires that facts necessary for
the imposition of consecutive sentences, other than facts relat-
ing to prior convictions, must be found by the jury or admitted
by the defendant.
An important case for capital defendants is Harbison v. Bell.68
Typically, state clemency proceedings are at the end of the road;
they come after a death sentence has been affirmed by the state
courts and after the defendant has lost his or her federal habeas
corpus petition.  Harbison will decide whether the statute that
provides federal funds for counsel who represent state capital
defendants in federal habeas corpus proceedings includes fund-
ing for counsel to continue their representation and pursue
State clemency proceedings.
All-in-all, the October 2008 Term promises a bevy of impor-
tant criminal law and procedure decisions, even if it lacks some
of the fireworks provided by last year’s headliners.
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